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MIRANDA’S APPLICATION TO THE
EXPANDING TERRY STOP
Daniel C. Isaacs*
INTRODUCTION
1
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by holding
that police may not interrogate a person taken into custody without
first reading to the suspect their now-familiar Miranda rights.2 The
question of what constitutes “police custody” is particularly vexing
in the context of “Terry stops:” warrantless searches and seizures
based upon reasonable suspicion, limited in scope, to determine
whether a person is armed or in the midst of criminal activity.3 As
the lawful scope of a Terry stop has expanded beyond its narrow
and limited genesis in Terry v. Ohio,4 federal circuits have been
unable to reach a consensus regarding whether a lawful Terry stop
may constitute Miranda custody.5 The First and Fourth Circuits
hold that a suspect is not in Miranda custody if the Terry stop was
lawful, i.e. reasonable.6 Conversely, the Second, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits hold that the reasonableness of a Terry
stop is irrelevant as to Miranda custody; if the circumstances of a

* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2010; B.A., Binghamton
University, 2007. Special thanks to my parents and Laura for their
encouragement, the entire staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their
endless editing assistance, and my friends for listening.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
Id. at 444.
3
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–31 (1968).
4
See infra Part I(B).
5
E.g., United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004).
6
E.g., United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995).

383

ISAACS REVISED.DOC

4/26/2010 11:44 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

384

Terry stop meet the threshold of Miranda custody, then Miranda
warnings are required before the suspect of a Terry stop may be
interrogated.7
This note argues that the determination of whether a suspect is
in “Miranda custody” does not turn on the legality of the Terry
stop. Part I will review Terry v. Ohio and present the dramatic
expansion of the scope of a Terry stop.8 Part II will review
Miranda v. Arizona and explain how courts have neglected to
clarify the definition of Miranda custody.9 Part III will survey the
circuit split regarding Miranda’s application to a Terry stop.10 Part
IV will argue for the Second Circuit’s independent approach, and
finally Part V will evaluate documented criticisms of this
proposal.11
I. TERRY V. OHIO
A. “Stop and Frisks:” An Exception to Probable Cause
Under the Fourth Amendment,12 warrantless searches and
seizures are presumed unreasonable.13 However, the Supreme
Court has created several exceptions to the presumptive warrant
requirement.14
The Warren Court sanctioned one such exception in Terry v.
7

Newton, 369 F.3d at 673.
See infra Part I.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part III.
11
See infra Part IV; Part V.
12
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”).
13
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
14
See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)
(permitting a warrantless entry of a home when police have an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that a person within the home is seriously
injured or threatened with injury); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,
414 (1976) (permitting a public arrest in the absence of a warrant); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (permitting a warrantless search that is
justified when officers are in “hot pursuit”).
8
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Ohio.15 “Where a police officer observes . . . conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous . . . he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others . . . to conduct” a search
reasonably related in scope to the initial justification for the
search.16 In Terry, a police officer observed two pedestrians,
Terry and Chilton, conducting “elaborately casual and oftrepeated reconnaissance” in front of a store window.17 The
officer approached the two pedestrians, along with a third man
with whom they were meeting, identified himself as a police
officer, patted down the outside of Terry’s clothing, and found a
18
.38-caliber revolver. He discovered another revolver in
Chilton’s overcoat pocket.19 After disarming the men, Chilton
and Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed
weapons.20
The issue presented to the Warren Court was whether “in all
the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, [Terry’s] right
to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and
seizure.”21 The Court analyzed the reasonableness of the search
by balancing the government’s interest in law enforcement and
public safety with the “nature and quality of the intrusion on
individual rights.”22
First, the Court “emphatically”23 rejected the notion that a
24
“stop and frisk” did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
15

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
Id. at 30.
17
Id. at 6.
18
Id. at 7.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 9.
22
Id. at 24.
23
Id. at 16.
24
Id.
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized”
that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English
16
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Second, the Court considered the societal importance of
permitting police officers to investigate their suspicions of
criminal or dangerous activity with less than probable cause.25
Chief Justice Warren noted that while law enforcement has an
interest in effective crime prevention and detection,26 there is an
additional, more “immediate interest” concerning a police
officer’s safety and assurance that he is not dealing with an
armed individual.27 Thus, the Court agreed that police officers
must be afforded an effective tool to protect themselves and the
public in situations where they may lack probable cause for a
search or arrest.28
Finally, the Court balanced the needs of law enforcement
and public safety against the intrusion of privacy.29 Chief Justice
Warren acknowledged that “even a limited search of the outer
clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion
upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.”30
Regardless, the proper compromise between the competing
interests of law enforcement and civil rights permitted a narrow
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause
requirement.31 The Court stressed that “[t]he sole justification”
of a Terry stop is the “protection of the police officer and others
nearby . . . .”32

language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of
a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons is not a “search.” Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge
that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the
citizen stands helpless . . . is a petty indignity.
Id.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 22.
at 23.
at 24.

at 29.

ISAACS REVISED.DOC

4/26/2010 11:44 PM

MIRANDA’S APPLICATION TO TERRY STOPS

387

B. The Expansion of Terry
The permissible degree of intrusion during a “stop and frisk”
has significantly expanded since 1968.33 In Terry, the Court
permitted a “carefully limited search of the outer
clothing . . . in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault [the police officer].”34 Early cases following
Terry interpreted this rule narrowly, hesitant to stray too far
from this limited exception to the probable cause requirement.35
In United States v. Strickler, for example, because police
officers encircled the defendant in his car with their weapons
raised,36 the Ninth Circuit found it impossible to “equate [this]
armed approach to a surrounded vehicle whose occupants have
been commanded to raise their hands with the ‘brief stop of a
suspicious individual in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information’ . . . .”37 Accordingly, the Terry stop was
unreasonable.38
In United States v. McLemure, the Tenth Circuit rejected the
government’s argument that an officer acted reasonably when he
drew his weapon, forced the defendant to lie face down, and
39
conducted a pat down. Construing Terry narrowly, the court

33

See United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1198 (7th Cir. 1990).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
35
See United States v. O’Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 1976)
(finding a Terry stop valid, in part because of the absence of drawn weapons,
handcuffs, force, and threats thereof); see also United States v. McLemure,
573 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378
(9th Cir. 1974).
36
Strickler, 490 F.2d 378–79. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he
restriction of Strickler’s ‘liberty of movement’ was complete when he was
encircled by police and confronted with official orders made at
gunpoint . . . [n]o significant, new restraint was added when Officer Ripley,
a few moments later, handcuffed Strickler and formally pronounced him
‘under arrest.’” Id. at 380 (internal citations omitted).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
United States v. McLemure, 573 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 1978).
34
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concluded the Terry stop was unreasonable.40 Similarly, the
defendant in Dunaway v. New York 41 was transported against his
will to the local police station and held in an interrogation room
where he was not free to leave.42 The Court held the police
conduct exceeded the brief detention authorized by Terry
because “in contrast to the brief and narrowly circumscribed
intrusions involved in those cases, the detention of petitioner
was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional
arrest.”43
More recently, however, the permissible degree of intrusion
permitted during a Terry stop has expanded far beyond the “stop
and frisk” originally upheld by the Supreme Court,44 presumably
45
as courts responded to rising violent crime. In Florida v.
46
Royer, the Court acknowledged, “the predicate permitting
seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law
enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal
security of the suspect,”47 but opened the door to Terry’s
expansion by explaining in dicta that “the scope of the intrusion
will vary” with the circumstances of each case.48 In United

40

Id.
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
42
Id. at 202–03.
43
Id.
44
The cases discussed in this section are not intended to be exhaustive,
but merely describe the willingness of courts to permit increasingly coercive
police conduct during Terry stops.
45
“The number of police officers killed annually in the line of duty has
tripled since Terry was decided; the number of those assaulted and wounded
has risen by a factor of twenty.” United States v. Micheletti, 13 F.3d 838,
844 (5th Cir. 1994).
46
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In Royer, the defendant
purchased an airline ticket under an assumed name. He was questioned by
police officers and his suitcases were searched. Royer moved to suppress the
evidence obtained by the search of his suitcases. The Court ultimately
determined that the detainment and search of Royer exceeded the legal scope
of an investigative stop, and the evidence was suppressed. Id. at 493–501.
47
Id. at 500.
48
Id.
41
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States v. Perdue,49 police officers approached the defendant’s car
with their weapons drawn and ordered the defendant to step out
and lie facedown on the ground.50 Then, the police allegedly
handcuffed the defendant and questioned him.51 The Tenth
Circuit concluded that while the officers’ warrantless seizure of
Perdue “border[ed] on an illegal arrest,” it was nonetheless a
reasonable Terry stop because the intrusion was justified by the
potentially dangerous circumstances of the encounter.52
In United States v. Quinn,53 police parked their cars behind
the defendant’s vehicle, blocked his exit, and questioned him for
twenty minutes until more officers arrived with drug-sniffing
dogs.54 The court concluded that the Terry stop was lawful and
saw “no way that the agents could have greatly shortened their
inquiry if they were to ‘confirm or dispel their suspicions’
meaningfully.”55 Additionally, the Quinn court observed the
emerging patchwork of law regarding the lawfulness of Terry
stops:
49

United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1458–59.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1462 (“It was not unreasonable under the circumstances for the
officers to execute the Terry stop with their weapons drawn. While Terry
stops generally must be fairly nonintrusive [sic], officers may take necessary
steps to protect themselves if the circumstances reasonably warrant such
measures. ‘[T]he use of guns in connection with a stop is permissible where
the police reasonably believe [the weapons] are necessary for their
protection.’ United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982).
Similarly, other circuits have held that police officers may draw their
weapons without transforming an otherwise valid Terry stop into an arrest.
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones,
759 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Jackson, 652 F.2d 244,
249 (2d Cir. 1981).”) (internal citations omitted). “The Fourth Amendment
does not require that officers unnecessarily risk their lives when encountering
a suspect whom they reasonably believe to be armed and dangerous.” Id. at
1463.
53
United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1987).
54
Id. at 155–56.
55
Id. at 158.
50
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[a]dmittedly, Terry, Dunaway, Royer, and Place,56
considered together, may in some instances create
difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an
investigative stop from a de facto arrest . . . . But our
cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry stops.
While it is clear that “the brevity of the invasion of the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important
factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally
intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable
suspicion,” . . . we have emphasized the need to
consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by
the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to
effectuate those purposes.57
Thus, Quinn acknowledged the increasing deference given to
law enforcement in their administration of a Terry stop.
A year later, in United States v. Serna-Barreto, Judge
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, deemed a Terry stop
valid when the investigating officer “pointed his gun at . . . [the
defendant] . . . [and] ordered her out of the car.”58 The court
upheld the stop, in large part because “many drug traffickers are
armed and they sometimes shoot policemen”59 and because the
defendant “testified that she was not scared by the gun.”60
Similarly, in United States v. Greene61 and United States v.
62
Hardnett, the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, respectively, deemed a
56

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
Quinn, 815 F.2d at 159 (footnotes citing cases mentioned therein
added).
58
United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1988).
59
Id. at 967.
60
Id. at 968.
Although subjective belief is not determinative on whether an
ostensible stop is actually an arrest, Serna-Barreto’s testimony is
strong evidence in an otherwise sketchy record that, if Officer
Dailey did in fact point his gun at her, he did so in a manner that
protected him without unduly threatening her.
Id.
61
United States v. Greene, 783 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986).
62
United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1986).
57
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warrantless investigative stop valid under Terry even though the
officer’s weapons were drawn.63
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Tilmon64
best illustrates the scope of the expansion of Terry.65 In Tilmon,
police were looking for a suspected bank robber.66 A police
officer spotted the vehicle described in the radio dispatch and
called for back-up units; he noted the driver “‘slid down in the
drivers seat’ as the police car approached . . . .”67 Next,
the police cars activated their flashing lights and Tilmon
pulled over. Over a loud speaker, Tilmon was
informed . . . that he should get out of the car with his
hands up and lie face down on the shoulder of the road.
Tilmon immediately complied. (According to Officer
Klanderman, some of the weapons were pointed at
Tilmon, and some were pointed at his car.) After he lay
down as directed, Tilmon was handcuffed and placed in a
squad car. A shotgun was pointed at Tilmon’s head while
he was handcuffed, searched and seated in the squad car
. . . . At the scene of the highway stop, Tilmon’s car had
been effectively blocked. There were at least five squad
cars abreast of and behind his car, and another police car
stopped one-quarter mile ahead of Tilmon’s car on the
shoulder of the road . . . . Officer Klanderman testified
that drawing weapons was standard procedure for a
felony stop “for the safety of the officers and any other
persons that may be in the area.”68
In rejecting Tilmon’s argument that the warrantless stop was
so forceful as to constitute a de facto arrest, and thus a violation
63

See Greene, 783 F.2d at 1367; Hardnett, 804 F.2d at 357.
United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221 (7th Cir. 1993).
65
Id. Tilmon has been cited as recently as April 11, 2008, specifically
for its proposition that if found to be justified, requiring a suspect to lie face
down while being handcuffed and/or briefly detained in an officer’s squad car
does not convert a Terry stop into an arrest. Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818,
825–26 (7th Cir. 2008).
66
Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1223.
67
Id.
68
Id.
64
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of the Fourth Amendment, the court recited the elements of a
valid Terry stop:
[t]he reasonableness of an investigatory stop may be
determined by examining: (1) whether the police were
aware of specific and articulable facts giving rise to
reasonable suspicion; and (2) whether the degree of
intrusion was reasonably related to the known facts. In
other words, the issue is whether the police conduct—
given
their
suspicions
and
the
surrounding
circumstances—was reasonable.69
The court concluded that the “police justifiably held a reasonable
suspicion that the car and its driver were involved in a bank
robbery.”70 Moreover, it found that based on the circumstances
of this particular matter—specifically that the suspect was
thought to be an armed felon—the scope of the intrusion was
reasonable.71 The court emphasized the risks posed to law
72
enforcement, particularly in a “felony stop:”
[w]hen effecting a Terry stop . . . police officers must
make a quick decision about how to protect themselves
and others from possible danger. They are not
necessarily required to “adopt alternative means to ensure
their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a
Terry encounter.” A court in its assessment “should take
care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly
developing situation, and in such cases the court should
not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.”73
Thus, “[t]o require an officer to risk his life in order to
make an investigatory stop would run contrary to the intent of
Terry v. Ohio.”74 Finally, the Tilmon court took notice of
Terry’s expansion:
69

Id. at 1224 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1968)).
Id. at 1225.
71
Id. at 1227.
72
Id. at 1225–26.
73
Id. at 1225 (citations omitted).
74
Id. at 1226 (citing United States v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208, 213 n.10
(5th Cir. 1974)).
70
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[i]n the recent past, the “permissible reasons for a stop
and search and the permissible scope of the intrusion
[under the Terry doctrine] have expanded beyond their
original contours.” The last decade “has witnessed a
multifaceted expansion of Terry,” including the “trend
granting officers greater latitude in using force in order
to ‘neutralize’ potentially dangerous suspects during an
investigatory detention.” For better or for worse, the
trend has led to the permitting of the use of handcuffs,
the placing of suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of
weapons and other measures of force more traditionally
associated with arrest than with investigatory detention.75
The court’s language makes clear that the justifications for
the stark departure from Terry’s narrow holding are the same as
the policy considerations that encouraged its advancement in the
first place. The increase in violent crime, gun violence,
America’s war on illegal drugs, and criminal sophistication since
1968 has enhanced the dangers associated with law
enforcement.76 Once the Supreme Court permitted an exception
to the probable cause requirement, lower courts that evaluated
the legality of officers’ actions on a case-by-case basis felt
compelled to maximize the tools officers had to protect their
safety.77
75

Id. at 1224–25 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
“The number of police officers killed annually in the line of duty has
tripled since Terry was decided; the numbers of those assaulted and wounded
have risen by a factor of twenty.” United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838,
844 (5th Cir. 1994).
77
In sum, in 1963, Officer McFadden stopped a person he reasonably
believed to be preparing for a robbery and frisked his outer clothing for the
presence of a weapon that could serve to harm the police officer or the
public. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7, 23, 28 (1968). In 1992, Spencer Ray
Tilmon was surrounded by five police cars and numerous police officers
whose arms were drawn, laid down on the ground on an interstate highway,
handcuffed while a shotgun was pointed at his head, and placed in a squad
car during the search of his car. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221,
1223 (7th Cir. 1994). Both courts found the officers had the requisite specific
and articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion of the defendants’
propensity for crime or imposition of public danger, and both courts
76
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II. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA: PROTECTING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. Miranda v. Arizona
Two years before Terry, the Warren Court addressed the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination78 in
Miranda v. Arizona.79 In the consolidated cases decided in
Miranda, police questioned a suspect in custody at the precinct
for an extended period of time, eventually eliciting a
confession.80 The Court set out to decide the trial admissibility of
statements obtained from questioning which shared certain
“salient features [including] incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere [that] result[ed] in
self-incriminating statements without full warnings of
constitutional rights.”81
The Warren Court sought to ensure that suspects’ Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was adequately
protected during the course of custodial interrogation.82 Miranda
responded to the coercive nature that a police-dominated
environment has on the will of a suspect in custody;83 that is,
when police conduct psychologically coercive in-custody
interrogation techniques, procedural safeguards must be
employed to offset their effect. First, the Court reiterated that
the Fifth Amendment privilege is available “outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in
which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way

concluded that the intrusiveness of the subsequent search was reasonable
under the circumstances and sufficiently limited in scope. See Terry, 392
U.S. at 30; Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1225, 1228.
78
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
79
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
80
Id. at 440.
81
Id. at 445.
82
Id. at 439.
83
See id. at 443.
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from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”84 Second, the
court emphasized that “an understanding of the nature and
setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential” to the
Court’s holding.85 In light of the one-sided nature of police
interrogation and the value of the privilege against selfincrimination,86 the Court held that the “prosecution may not use
statements, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination.”87 These required procedural safeguards must
inform the defendant that “he has the right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney.”88
Accordingly, Miranda warnings are required when the subject is
(1) in police custody and (2) interrogated by the police.89 The
Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
90
significant way.” Subsequent lower courts have struggled to
identify the appropriate threshold of custody and interrogation
that triggers Miranda.
1. Miranda Custody
The Supreme Court specifically addressed whether an
84

Id. at 467.
Id. at 445. The Court commented on the history of physically abusive
interrogation tactics, but stressed that coercion can be mental as well as
physical. See id. at 446, 449. In the Court’s own words, the compulsion
directed towards suspects stems from the individual being “swept from
familiar surroundings,” being “surrounded by antagonistic forces,” and being
“subject to techniques intended to subjugate the individual to the will of his
examiner.” Id. at 457, 461.
86
Id. at 468.
87
Id. at 444.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. The Court did not articulate with further specificity factors
indicative of custodial interrogation.
85
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arrestee was in sufficient custody as to warrant Miranda
warnings in Orozco v. Texas.91 Justice Black rejected the state’s
argument that since the suspect was in familiar surroundings (his
bedroom), Miranda did not apply.92 Instead, the Court laid down
a bright-line rule: if a person is arrested, he is in custody for
purposes of Miranda.93
In California v. Beheler,94 the suspect agreed to accompany
police officers to the police station for questioning.95 The suspect
was informed he was not under arrest. He left, unrestrained,
after the questioning.96 The Court stated:
although the circumstances of each case must certainly
influence a determination of whether a suspect is “in
custody” for purposes of receiving of Miranda
protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is
a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of
the degree associated with a formal arrest . . . [b]ut we
have explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not
required “simply because the questioning takes place in
the station house, or because the questioned person is one
whom the police suspect.”97
Accordingly, the Court found that Beheler was not in
custody for Miranda purposes, forcefully explaining, “it is
beyond doubt that Beheler was neither taken into custody nor
significantly deprived of his freedom of action. Indeed,

91

Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
Id. at 326.
93
Id. at 326–27. Justice White’s dissent expressed disdain that the
custody requirement of Miranda was “dilute[d].” Id. at 330. Relying on the
language in Miranda that focused on the extremes and coerciveness of inhouse custodial interrogations, Justice White argued that Miranda and the
policies underlying it were not meant to reach beyond the police station and
criticized the majority for assuming, without discussion, that it did so. Id. at
329.
94
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
95
Id. at 1122.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1125.
92
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Beheler’s freedom was not restricted in any way whatsoever.”98
The Supreme Court’s next significant decision regarding
Miranda custody came in Berkemer v. McCarty.99 In this case,
an Ohio state highway patrolman stopped a suspect weaving in
and out of a highway lane.100 At the scene of the traffic stop, the
officer asked the suspect if he had been using intoxicants and the
suspect replied that he had “consumed two beers and had
smoked several joints of marijuana . . . .”101 The suspect was
arrested and later sought to have those statements suppressed on
the grounds that he was not first read his Miranda rights at the
scene of the traffic stop before his arrest.102 The Court held that
“roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop” was not “custodial interrogation.”103 The
Court acknowledged that a usual traffic stop is analogous to a
Terry stop and the nature of these detentions (Terry stops)
“explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that
Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.”104 The Court
concluded, “fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda105
requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of
situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are
implicated.”106
107
In United States v. Brown, the Eighth Circuit suggested six
indicia for determining whether a suspect is in custody for
Miranda purposes:

98

Id. at 1123.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
100
Id. at 423.
101
Id.
102
See id. at 424.
103
Id. at 435. Berkemer also established an objective test to determine
whether a suspect was “subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody:’”
the “relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would
have understood his situation.” Id. at 440, 442.
104
Id. at 440.
105
Id. at 437. Specifically, the Court was referring to the phrase
“deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.” Id. at 428.
106
Id. at 437.
107
United States v. Brown, 990 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1993).
99
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(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of
questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the
suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so,
or that the suspect was not considered under arrest; (2)
whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of
movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect
initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced
to official request to respond to questions; (4) whether
strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed
during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the
questioning was police dominated; and (6) whether the
suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the
questioning.108
Even if a person is in custody, however, he or she must still
be “interrogated” in order to trigger Miranda.109
2. Miranda Interrogation
Miranda defined interrogation as “questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers,”110 but the Court has maintained that
investigatory tactics other than direct questioning can be
“interrogation.” In Rhode Island v. Innis,111 the Court held that
“the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to
express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”112

108

Id. at 399. “The presence of the first three indicia tends to mitigate
the existence of custody at the time of questioning” while the “presence of
the last three indicia aggravate the existence of custody.” Id.
109
See Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1244 (3d Cir. 1994).
110
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
111
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
112
Id. at 301.
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III. THE CIRCUITS’ SPLIT OVER MIRANDA’S APPLICABILITY TO
TERRY STOPS
Terry’s expansion to permit increasingly coercive searches
and seizures113 has caught up to Miranda. The First and Fourth
Circuits reason that if the Terry stop is lawful under the Fourth
Amendment, then the suspect is not in Miranda custody.114
Conversely, the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits consider the Fourth and Fifth Amendment questions
separately, holding that a Terry stop may be lawful under the
Fourth Amendment, but may still rise to a degree of intrusion
that constitutes Miranda custody.115
A. The First and Fourth Circuits’ Categorical Approach
The First and Fourth Circuits extend the holding of
Berkemer from traffic stops to all lawful Terry stops, holding
that if a Terry stop based upon reasonable suspicion is lawful at
inception and in scope, then the suspect is not in Miranda
custody.116 In other words, they apply a categorical rule that only
if a Terry stop rises to the level of a de facto arrest, and thus is
no longer a lawful Terry stop, would Miranda warnings be
required.
In United States v. Trueber,117 for example, police officers
garnered reasonable suspicion that Trueber was smuggling
drugs.118 Officers spoke with Trueber for ten-to-fifteen minutes
113

See supra Part I(B).
United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2001); United States
v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
115
In United States v. Artiles–Martin, Judge Hodges noted that “[t]he
First [and] Fourth . . . Circuits hold that so-called Terry reasonableness
means Miranda warnings are not required, even if the stop was
coercive . . . [while] the Second, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits hold that
a coercive Terry stop requires warnings but still is deemed a valid Terry
stop.” United States v. Artiles–Martin, No. 5:08-cr-14-Oc-10GRJ, 2008 WL
2600787, *11 n.38 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2008).
116
Trueber, 238 F.3d 79; Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105.
117
Trueber, 238 F.3d 79.
118
Id. at 82.
114
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after pulling his truck over, and then for approximately one hour
and twenty minutes further at his motel room.119 Agents kept
Trueber under constant surveillance.120 Trueber was then
arrested.121 The lower court suppressed all statements made by
Trueber before his arrest, reasoning that “for purposes of
Miranda, Trueber was in custody when questioned and,
therefore, all statements violated Miranda and should be
suppressed.”122
On appeal, the First Circuit concurred with Berkemer that
“routine traffic stops are more analogous to a Terry stop than to
a formal arrest, and, therefore, are not custodial for purposes of
Miranda.”123 The court concluded that “the investigatory stop
was justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place . . . [w]hat occurred was thus a permissible Terry stop.”124
Since “[n]othing the agents did or said sufficed to convert the
investigatory stop into an arrest requiring the administration of
Miranda warnings,” the statements’ suppression was
125
overturned. Trueber’s focus, on whether the stop was lawful
or whether it exceeded the scope of a Terry stop to become a de
facto arrest thus requiring Miranda warnings,126 suggests that
only upon the latter circumstance, and never upon the former,
would Miranda warnings be required.127
The Fourth Circuit also applies a categorical rule with regard
to Miranda’s applicability to Terry stops. In United States v.
119

Id. at 84–85.
Id.
121
Id. at 87.
122
Id. at 91.
123
Id. at 92 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)).
124
Id. at 95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
A lower court in the First Circuit appears to have deviated from
Trueber’s holding. In United States v. Massaro, the district court asserted
that the First Circuit would recognize that “even during a lawful Terry stop,
the restraint of a suspect can amount to a formal arrest.” United States v.
Massaro, 560 F. Supp. 2d 96, 105 (D. Mass. 2008).
120
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Leshuk,128 a turkey hunter uncovered marijuana growing in the
woods.129 He alerted the police, and deputy sheriffs found the
two defendants nearby with two backpacks and a brown plastic
garbage bag in their possession.130 The deputies ordered the
defendants to raise their hands, frisked them, and “determined
they were not armed.”131 The deputies then asked several
questions that the defendants answered.132 On appeal, Leshuk
argued that his statements made during the deputies’ questioning
at the scene, before his arrest, “should be suppressed because
the deputies improperly interrogated him without administering
warnings pursuant to Miranda.”133 The Leshuk court found that
the officers’ conduct did not exceed the scope of a lawful Terry
stop.134 The court distinguished a Terry stop from a custodial
interrogation by noting that a Terry stop “must last no longer
than necessary to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion.”135
In sum, the First and Fourth Circuits have adopted a
categorical rule that extends Berkemer’s holding: if the Terry
stop was lawful, then the suspect was not in Miranda custody.
However, not all circuits agree with this approach.
B. The Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits’
Independent Approach
These circuits reason that because a lawful Terry stop may
include behavior commensurate with a formal arrest, a detainee
of a lawful Terry stop, that is, a stop that does not rise to the
level of a de facto arrest, may still be entitled to Miranda
warnings.

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1106–07.
Id.
Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1109.
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1. Second Circuit
In United States v. Newton,136 three parole officers and three
police officers arrived at the Wrights’ apartment upon word that
the Wrights’ son, Newton, had threatened to kill the Wrights.137
The officers handcuffed Newton without advising him of his
Miranda rights, explaining that it was for his and the officers’
safety, and that he was not under arrest.138 Newton thereafter
told the police that he had a gun in his apartment and where it
was.139 On appeal to the Second Circuit, Newton asserted that
his responses to inquiries from the officers ought to have been
suppressed because his restraint rose to a degree consistent with
that of formal custody but was not preceded by Miranda
warnings.140
The court rejected the categorical approach of the First and
Fourth Circuit—that “where an investigatory stop is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, the seized suspect is not ‘in
custody’ for purposes of Miranda.”141 Rather, the Second Circuit
found that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is not the standard
for resolving Miranda custody challenges.142 In other words,
“whether a ‘stop’ was permissible under Terry v. Ohio . . . is
irrelevant to the Miranda analysis. Terry is an ‘exception’ to the
Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement, not to the Fifth
Amendment protections against self-incrimination.”143 Instead,
the Second Circuit asked whether a “reasonable person in
defendant’s position would have understood himself to be
subjected to the restraints comparable to those associated with a
144
formal arrest.” Facts the court deemed relevant included:
(1) the length of time involved in the stop; (2) its public
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id. at 663–64.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 673 (citing Trueber and Leshuk).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Ali, 69 F.3d 1467, 1472 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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or private setting; (3) the number of participating law
enforcement officers; (4) the risk of danger presented by
the person stopped; and (5) the display or use of physical
force against the person stopped, including firearms,
handcuffs, and leg irons.145
The court’s willingness to extend Miranda protections to
lawful Terry stops did not invalidate the lawfulness of the Terry
stop: “the Fourth Amendment permits the officer to take
‘necessary measures . . . to neutralize the threat’ without
converting a reasonable stop into a de facto arrest.”146
Accordingly, the Terry stop was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, but “nevertheless placed him in custody for
purposes of Miranda.”147
2. Seventh Circuit
United States v. Smith148 considered whether a suspect
detained and handcuffed during a Terry stop should have been
read Miranda warnings.149 The court explained, “[t]he purpose
of permitting a temporary detention without probable cause or a
warrant is to protect police officers and the general
public . . . [but] [t]he purpose of the Miranda rule, however, is
145

Id. at 674.
Id. This is consistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468, 1473 (2d Cir. 1995):
Terry is an “exception” to the Fourth Amendment probable cause
requirement, not to the Fifth Amendment protections against selfincrimination . . . . The fact that the seizure and search of a suspect
comports with the Fourth Amendment under Terry simply does not
determine whether the suspect’s contemporaneous oral admissions
may be used against him or her at trial.
147
Id. at 677. However, since these statements fell within the public
safety exception to Miranda, under New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984), the court did not err in refusing to suppress Newton’s statements.
United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677 (2d Cir. 2004).
148
United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 1993).
149
Id. at 1094. “We will not substitute our judgment for that of the
officers as to the best methods to investigate.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Boden, 854 F.2d 983, 993 (7th Cir. 1988)).
146
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not to protect the police or the public . . . [but to] protect the
fairness of the trial.”150 Thus, the court read Berkemer to stand
for the proposition that Miranda rights may be triggered even if
a defendant has not been subjected to an arrest or a de facto
arrest.151
3. Eighth Circuit
In United States v. Martinez, a suspect was placed in
handcuffs, patted down for weapons, detained, and interrogated
about his possession of weapons and cash.152 The court ruled that
the encounter was a valid Terry stop, but nonetheless continued
to analyze whether the suspect was in Miranda custody.153 After
rejecting the government’s argument “that so long as the
encounter remained a Terry stop, no Miranda warnings were
required,”154 the court “followed the Supreme Court’s cue” and
read Berkemer to imply that the dispositive consideration is not
whether the encounter was a valid Terry stop, but what the
circumstances of the stop were.155 The court ultimately
determined that the detainee, despite not being under arrest
during the lawful Terry stop, was entitled to Miranda
warnings.156
4. Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Kim,157 the Ninth Circuit held that the
lower court correctly suppressed the defendant’s statements
150

Id. at 1097.
Id.
152
United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir. 2006).
153
Id. at 908 (“Whether Martinez was ‘in custody’ for purposes of
Miranda after being handcuffed during the Terry stop is a separate question
from whether that handcuffing constituted an arrest for which probable cause
was required.”).
154
Id. at 909 (emphasis added).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2002).
151
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during the course of a Terry stop because “under the totality of
circumstances, a reasonable person in Kim’s circumstances
would not have felt free to leave,” and therefore Kim was in
Miranda custody.158 The court ruled so, despite the fact the
defendant was not under arrest, because “the circumstances
during the questioning of the defendant warranted advising [her]
of her rights.”159
5. Tenth Circuit
In United States v. Perdue,160 police conducting an
investigative stop ordered the defendant and his fiancée to get
out of their stopped car and lie face down.161 The officers drew
their guns as the defendant made various statements regarding
marijuana in his vehicle.162 The defendant appealed the district
court’s decision not to suppress his statements, challenging the
lower court’s conclusion that since he was interrogated during a
valid Terry stop, Miranda warnings were not required.163
The Perdue court concluded that the district court “merged
several distinct constitutional inquiries into one.”164 The court
first held that the officer’s investigative stop of Perdue was a
valid Terry stop.165 Next, the court acknowledged that Miranda
rights might be implicated during a valid Terry stop because
“[p]olice officers must make a choice—if they are going to take
highly intrusive steps to protect themselves from danger, they
must similarly provide protection to their suspects by advising

158

Id. at 978.
Id. at 973.
160
United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
161
Id. at 1458.
162
Id. at 1459.
163
Id. at 1461.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 1463. The court concluded that under the circumstances, the use
of drawing their weapons and displaying some force was reasonable. Id. at
1462. The court also noted that this conduct “border[ed] on an illegal arrest.”
Id.
159
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them of their constitutional rights.”166 Because “[a] reasonable
man in Mr. Perdue’s position could not have misunderstood the
fact that if he did not immediately cooperate, his life would be
in danger . . . [and] [a]ny reasonable person in Mr. Perdue’s
position would have felt completely at the mercy of the police,”
Perdue was in Miranda custody.167
Thus, contrary to the categorical rule adopted by the First
and Fourth Circuits, the above circuits have adopted an
independent approach by which the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment issues are analyzed separately.
IV. THE INDEPENDENT APPROACH HAS IT RIGHT
Ultimately, evaluating Miranda custody separately and
distinctly from the legality of the underlying Terry stop best
balances law enforcement interests with suspects’ Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights. The First and Fourth Circuits’
categorical rule that Terry detainees are not in Miranda custody
ignores the extension of Terry stops from a simple stop-and-frisk
to police seizures that include drawn weapons, limited force,
168
interrogation, and detention. As a result, their approach fails
to recognize that these intrusive techniques approach precisely
the sort of coercive atmosphere that sparked the need for
Miranda’s prophylactic rule. Alternatively, the independent
approach, adopted by the Second Circuit and others, supports
the policy justifications behind Terry and Miranda. This
approach, coupled with courts continuing their efforts to clarify
what restraints constitute Miranda custody and applying the
169
public safety exception promulgated in New York v. Quarles to
Terry stops, minimizes burdens on law enforcement.

166
167
168
169

Id. at 1465.
Id. (quoting United States v. Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984)).
See generally id. at 1462.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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A. The Second Circuit’s Approach Best Balances Suspects’
Rights with Law Enforcement Interests
Newton’s approach, shared by the Seventh, Eight, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits,170 displays more sensible constitutional law by
acknowledging and accepting the increasingly coercive nature of
the Terry stop and applying distinct Miranda analysis without
disturbing it.
First, an independent approach concedes that different values
underlie Terry and Miranda. Terry values the balance between
an individual’s right to privacy against law enforcement’s goal
of public safety.171 Miranda values a suspect’s privilege against
172
self-incrimination. Just as a prophylactic rule protecting a
person’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
distinct from a person’s Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure, so too should Miranda custody
analysis be distinct from Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Put
simply, just because a Terry stop may be reasonable, the police
officer’s conduct may still (lawfully) rise to the level imagined
by Chief Justice Warren in Miranda. To disregard the possible
applicability of Miranda warnings to this type of Terry stop
ignores the values that motivated Miranda.
Second, in Miranda, the Court held that warnings are not
just applied to arrest custody, but also to custodial detentions
that detain the suspect in any significant way.173 While Berkemer
held that routine traffic stops do not rise to the level of detention
imagined by Miranda,174 the facts of Berkemer are
distinguishable from the ultra-coercive Terry stops described in
Newton and Perdue. While these coercive Terry stops may still
not constitute de facto arrests, their use of limited force, drawn
weapons, handcuffs, and extended duration certainly resemble
the compelling environment of an arrest more than a traffic stop.

170
171
172
173
174

See supra Part III(B).
Terry, 392 at 23–28.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
Id. at 444.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 458 U.S., 420, 437–40 (1984).

ISAACS REVISED.DOC

4/26/2010 11:44 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

408

Third, categorical denial of Miranda to Terry stops assumes,
incorrectly, that all Terry stops are intrusions on personal liberty
not worthy of the prophylactic protections of Miranda.175 Just
like not all arrests are the sort of police-dominated stationhouse
interrogations imagined by Miranda, not all Terry stops are the
minor intrusions on personal liberty imagined by Terry.
Fourth, Chief Justice Warren, in Miranda, failed to actually
define “custody” as an “arrest.”176 In fact, he failed to define
“custody” at all.177 It is reasonable to conclude that the two were
not intended by the Court to be synonymous. Analogously, just
as Miranda was framed in the in-station police-dominated
environment, Miranda warnings are now given to all arrests
regardless of the degree of coerciveness of the environment.
Since Miranda left the confines of the police station, it is not
incongruous to argue it should leave the confines of a formal or
de facto arrest.178
Finally, the Berkemer Court admitted that a bright-line rule
stating Miranda does not apply until a suspect is officially placed
under arrest would “enable the police to circumvent the
constraints on custodial interrogations established by
Miranda.”179 By denying Miranda’s application to Terry stops,
police may find incentive to put off an arrest until after they
have finished questioning a detainee.
B. More Concretely Define the Scope of Miranda Custody
Courts applying the independent approach must clarify what
restraints actually constitute Miranda custody in order to
minimize the burdens on law enforcement that include overcomplication and exclusion of evidence at trial. In Newton, the
175

Richard A. Williamson, The Virtues (and Limits) of Shared Values:
The Fourth Amendment and Miranda’s Concept of Custody, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 379, 409 (1993).
176
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
177
Id.
178
See generally Williamson, supra note 175 (explaining the expansion of
Miranda warnings beyond the traditional bounds of a formal arrest).
179
Berkemer, 458 U.S. at 441.
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Second Circuit noted the “difficulty of determining ‘custody’ for
purposes of Miranda and the Supreme Court’s lack of clear
guidance on the issue.”180 At least one commentator has noted
that when Miranda was decided, the legal terms “custody” and
“arrest” meant roughly the same thing.181 This is no longer the
case,182 in part due to exceptions to the warrant requirement and
increasing ambiguity as to the role and permissible substance of
a Terry stop. If a court accepts the proposition that Miranda
custody can be achieved without an arrest, it is irresponsible to
expect police officers to determine when to deliver Miranda
warnings based on an admittedly vague standard, and then
punish their incorrect judgment by excluding statements made
during the encounters.
In Miranda, the Court stated specifically that an
“understanding of the nature and setting of [an] in-custody
interrogation is essential to” their decision.183 Since the nature
and setting of interrogations has changed,184 so must the analysis
of whether Miranda applies.
While the Second and Eighth Circuits have identified factors
to determine whether Miranda custody was met,185 these
180

United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 670 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing
Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2001)).
181
Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional
Doctrines Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 741 (1994).
182
Id.
183
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
184
Supra Part II(A)(i).
185
See Newton, 369 F.3d at 674 (“Among the facts generally deemed
relevant are (1) the length of time involved in the stop; (2) its public or
private setting; (3) the number of participating law enforcement officers;
(4) the risk of danger presented by the person stopped; and (5) the display or
use of physical force against the person stopped, including firearms,
handcuffs, and leg irons.”); United States v. Brown, 990 F.2d 397, 399 (8th
Cir. 1993) (“(1) [W]hether the suspect was informed at the time of
questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to
leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered
under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of
movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact with
authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official request to respond to
questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were
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multiple-factor analyses do little to assist the police officer
engaging in a spontaneous and fast on-the-street encounter.
Common sense suggests that police officers asked to rely on
such a multiple-factor analysis would in fact be relying on
intuition—where the cost of an officer’s wrong intuition is
exclusion,186 a firmer standard, designed for the needs of police
officers conducting rapidly developing investigative stops, is
imperative.
C. The Application of Quarles’ Public Safety Exception to
Terry Stops
Quarles’ public safety exception permits statements made to
police, before the reading of Miranda warnings, to be included
as evidence in an ensuing criminal trial so long as the
questioning by the police was reasonably prompted by an
immediate concern for the safety of the police or public.187 Given
this exception, Miranda warnings are only required during a
Terry stop when police interrogation is targeted at gathering
evidence, and not required before questions directed at resolving
an immediate threat to public and officer safety. The public
safety exception mitigates burdens on law enforcement, bolsters
the policies that justify Terry stops, and balances the detainee’s
civil right to Miranda warnings against public and officer safety.
In Quarles, a woman told two police officers in Queens,
New York, that she was just raped; she described the man and
told the officers he had just entered a nearby supermarket and
188
was armed. An officer reached the suspect in the store, frisked
him, and discovered an empty shoulder holster.189 After
employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning
was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at
the termination of the questioning.”). See also supra Part II(A)(i).
186
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (disallowing the admission
of evidence seized pursuant to an unlawful search during the trial of the
subject of the unlawful search).
187
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
188
Id. at 651–52.
189
Id.
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handcuffing him, the officer asked where the gun was—the
suspect “nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and
responded, ‘the gun is over there.’”190 The officer then placed
the suspect under arrest and read him his Miranda rights.191
Quarles sought to have his statement, “the gun is over
there,” excluded from trial because the officer had not yet given
him his Miranda warnings.192 The Court noted that this case
presented a situation where “concern for public safety must be
paramount to adherence to the literal language of the
prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda,”193 and thus
established a “public safety” exception to Miranda.194 The Court
was largely persuaded by the realities of the encounter:195 first,
in apprehending the suspect, the officers were confronted with
the immediate necessity of discovering the location of a hidden
gun in a public place. The situation posed dangers to the public
because an accomplice might use it, or a customer or employee
may find it.196 Second, the Court noted that if the police are
“required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before asking
the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles’ position might
well be deterred from responding.”197 The police officer “needed
an answer to his question not simply to make his case against
Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not
result from the concealment of the gun in a public area.”198
190

Id.
Id.
192
See id.
193
Id. at 653.
194
Id. at 655. The Court also clarified that the availability of this
exception does not depend upon the individual motivations of the police. Id.
at 656. “In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these
officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is
necessarily the order of the day, the application of the exception which we
recognize today should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a
suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting
officer.” Id.
195
See id. at 657.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. (emphasis added).
191
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Third, the Court recognized the importance of an easily
workable rule “to guide police officers, who have only limited
time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront.”199 Finally, while admitting that the present exception
muddied Miranda’s bright-line rule, the Court concluded that
this exception would not be difficult for police officers to apply
because in each case police should be able to distinguish
between questions necessary to secure personal or public safety
and questions designed to elicit testimonial evidence.200
Thus, if Terry stops may rise to Miranda custody, then
Quarles’ public safety exception permits police to interrogate
Terry detainees regarding immediate threats to public or officer
safety without first delivering Miranda warnings. Since Terry
stops are limited to resolving officers’ reasonable suspicions that
a suspect is dangerous or about to commit a crime, it is likely
that Miranda warnings will be excepted under Quarles during
most Terry stops. Indeed, the Newton court took such an
approach, ruling that although the defendant was in custody
during his interrogation, the questioning, which was directed to
the recovery of a gun, fell within the Quarles public safety
exception to Miranda and survived suppression.201
V. POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF THE INDEPENDENT APPROACH
A. The Costs of Issuing Miranda Warnings During a Terry
Stop Outweigh the Benefits of the Prophylactic Rule
Delivering Miranda warnings outside police station custodial
interrogations can impose a significant cost and undermine
202
effective law enforcement:
199

Id. at 658 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)).
Id. at 658–59.
201
United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 677 (2d. Cir. 2004)
(“[A]lthough Newton was in custody at the time of the challenged
interrogation, questioning preliminary to the officers’ recovery of the charged
firearm fell within the public safety exception to Miranda.”).
202
Note, Custodial Engineering: Cleaning Up The Scope of Miranda
200
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[t]he mere recital of a Miranda warning formalizes a
police-civilian interaction, which “may discourage
citizens from cooperating with the police” . . . the recital
of the warning and the detainee’s likely responses also
delay an on-the-scene investigation, which may endanger
the police and public . . . vague Miranda requirements
jeopardize on-the-scene inquiries by causing uncertainty
for the police officers who must administer the warning,
the subject who receives it, and the courts that must
review it . . . empirical evidence demonstrates that the
Terry stop, frisk, and inquiry “should not be
underestimated” as a deterrent to crime . . . it would
threaten the unstructured and spontaneous nature of the
Terry stop by formalizing the inquiry . . . it would block
the proper execution of Terry by increasing the potential
for unconstitutional delay during the brief stop . . . [all
are] additional burdens on a Terry stop [that] would
diminish its utility to law enforcement, and that result
contradicts the recent efforts by courts to ensure that
Terry stop, frisk, and inquiry remains a viable
investigative option.203
The Warren Court recognized the burdens that law
enforcement officials must bear,204 but remained adamant that the
privilege
against
self-incrimination
demanded
certain
205
sacrifices. Thus, as Terry stops increasingly resemble the type
of intrusive conduct the Miranda Court deemed serious enough
to warrant a prophylactic rule, society must accept the sacrifices
Miranda requires in the context of a Terry stop. Moreover,
Quarles’ public safety exception mitigates these potential costs to
safety by excepting questions directed towards resolving an
immediate danger to public or officer safety. And while issuing
Custody During Coercive Terry Stops, 108 HARV. L. REV. 665 (1995).
203
Id. (emphasis added).
204
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966).
205
Id. at 479. “The quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely
measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law.” Id.
at 480, n.50 (citing Walter V. Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956)).
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Miranda warnings to a suspect may result in a failure to obtain
evidence that would otherwise be collected, this cost to society
is tempered by the prevention of the coercive means by which
that evidence would have been obtained.
B. Police Will Be Unable to Determine Whether They Have
Placed a Suspect in Miranda Custody
Before the permissible scope of a Terry stop expanded, the
concepts of “arrest” and “custody” were closely related and
Terry stops looked nothing like the behavior that constituted
Miranda custody.206 Simply, officers knew Miranda warnings
were not required during a lawful Terry stop. However, if
Miranda applies to Terry stops, police officers must determine
more than whether they have the requisite reasonable suspicion
to conduct an investigative stop. In addition, they must consider
whether the level of coerciveness with which they are
conducting the search constitutes a custodial or non-custodial
investigative stop for Miranda purposes, as well as whether their
questions are directed at gathering evidence or resolving an
immediate public safety suspicion.
While these additional requirements complicate the
orchestration of a Terry stop, they are necessary to balance the
privilege against self-incrimination against the safety of the
public and police officers. The difficulty of determining Miranda
custody could be answered more easily with firmer guidelines
from courts.207 Further, inquiry into the purpose of an officer’s
questioning will not significantly impose on law enforcement
efforts. As the Court explained in Quarles, “[w]e think police
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between
questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of
the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial
208
evidence from a suspect.”

206
207
208

Williamson, supra note 175.
See supra Part IV(B).
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658–59 (1984).
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C. Terry Should Be Returned to Its Original Contours
One commentator proposes resolving the Circuit split
regarding the application of Miranda to Terry by returning “the
Terry doctrine to its pre-expansion dimensions, and thereby
diffus[ing] the tension that has recently been created between
Terry and Miranda.”209 In short, the commentator argues that the
best option to resolve the question of Miranda applicability to
Terry is to reverse the expansion of Terry for two reasons:
“(1) it is contrary to relevant Supreme Court authority, and
(2) it has not been supported by persuasive or logical
rationales.”210 Further “any frustration of police investigatory
tactics caused by reversing Terry’s uncalled-for expansion would
be counteracted by the efficiency and bright-line nature of the
resulting rule.”211
This argument does not attack the soundness of the circuits’
differing views, but rather identifies a misstep by courts in
permitting an environment to develop that is capable of fostering
212
the present disagreement. Although the simplicity of this
approach is attractive, it ignores the reason that Terry expanded:
an evolution of the type and rate of crime in this country since
the Warren Court’s decisions.213 Regardless of the virtues of
Terry’s expansion, courts must take steps to protect suspects
Fifth Amendment rights.214

209

Godsey, supra note 181, at 741 (emphasis added).
Id.
211
Id. at 747.
212
A response that fully addresses this argument is most appropriate for
another case comment or article.
213
United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1994).
214
United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Police
officers must make a choice–if they are going to take highly intrusive steps to
protect themselves from danger, they must similarly provide protection to
their suspects by advising them of their constitutional rights.”).
210
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CONCLUSION
In August of 2008, the Attorney General of New Mexico
filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
requesting review of the New Mexico Court of Appeals’
decision in State v. Snell,215 which adopted the independent
approach and required Miranda warnings be read to a suspect
detained in a squad car at a Terry traffic stop.216 The Court of
Appeals stated that if a “motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that
renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by
Miranda.”217 Challenging this decision, the Attorney General
cited to the First and Fourth Circuit’s approach in Trueber and
Leshuk to support its position that New Mexico’s high court
misapplied Berkemer and Miranda.218 The State’s petition
acknowledged that
[c]ourts and commentators alike have struggled with the
manner in which the concept of arrest intersects the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . . The question
seemingly left open by Berkemer, and on which both
federal and state courts disagree, is whether Miranda
extends to investigative detentions in which police
officers use a greater than normal level of force in
response to safety or other law enforcement concerns
without effecting a de facto arrest.219
The petition was denied on December 1, 2008,220 and thus the
question will continue to be reserved for states and lower courts.
215

New Mexico v. Snell, 166 P.2d 1106 (2007).
Id. at 1111–12.
217
Snell, 166 P.3d at 1111.
218
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, State v. Snell, 129 S. Ct. 626
(2008) (No. 08-196), available at 2008 WL 3833284.
219
Id. at 7. The petition also noted that the Second Circuit recognized a
circuit split and broke from the First and Fourth Circuit in their approach to
the application of Miranda to Terry stops. Id.
220
State v. Snell, 129 S. Ct. 626 (2008).
216
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As the constitutional guidelines governing criminal
procedures evolve, it is imperative that the new rules reflect the
actual changes and practices of law enforcement. Mindful of the
changes in nature of a Terry stop, courts ought to apply Miranda
to the context of a lawful Terry stop that rises to the level of
custody imagined by Miranda.

